Abstract. A publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme, named by Stadler in [Sta96], is a special VSS scheme in which anyone, not only the shareholders, can verify that the secret shares are correctly distributed. The property of public verifiability is what the first proposed VSS scheme [CGMA85] incorporated but later protocols [GMW87, Fe187, Ped911 failed to include. PVSS can provide some interesting properties in the systems using VSS. For instance, it gives a practical solution to ( k , /)-threshold VSS assuming no broadcast channel. Stadler proposed two PVSS protocols: one is as secure as the Decision-Diffie-Hellman problem and the other is not formally discussed about security. This paper presents a practical and provably secure PVSS scheme which is O(l.1) times more efficient than Stadler's PVSS schemes where Iwl denotes the size of the secret. It can be incorporated into various cryptosystems based on the factoring and the discrete logarithm to transform them into publicly verifiable key escrow (PVKE) systems. In addition, those key escrow cryptosystems can be easily modified into the verifiable partial key escrow (VPKE) ones with the property of delayed recovery [BG97]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first realization of a VPKE cryptosystern based on the factoring with the delayed recovery.
Introduction

(Verifiable) Secret Sharing
Secret sharing (including verifiable secret sharing) is one of the most important tools in modern cryptography. T h e concept and first realization of secret sharing were presented independently in [Sha79] and in [Bla79] . In a secret sharing (SS) scheme, there exist a dealer and I shareholders. The dealer splits a secret, s, into 1 different pieces, called shares, and sends each share to each shareholder through t h e private secure channels. If the dealer is honest, the collaboration of any number of shareholders more than or equal to k can recover s while if the dealer is dishonest, the collaboration of any k shareholders fails to retrieve the unique secret, s. Here k is called a threshold if any (k -1) shareholders cannot recover. the secret.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) was proposed first in [CGMA85] to overcome the problem of dishonest dealers. In a VSS scheme, the shareholders can verify the validity of their shares, that is, they can be convinced t h a t any group of more than or equal to k shareholders can recover a unique secret. VSS is known to play essential roles in various cryptographic protocols such as the multi-party protocols [BGWSS, CCDSS] 
Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing and Previous Proposal
The first proposed VSS scherne [CGMA85] has the special property that anyone, not only the shareholders, can verify that the shares were correctly distributed to the shareholders. However, this property was lost in later eficient protocols [Fe187, PedYl] . In these schemes, cach shareholder can verify the validity of only his own share.
Recently, Stadler has paid attention to thc lost property. In [Sta96] , the property was called publac verzjiabrlity and the VSS schemes with the above property were named pubhcly verifiable secret shanng (PVSS) schemes.
Informally speaking, PVSS schemes require public-key encryption functions, E l , , , . , El, assigncd to every shareholder Pi. The dealer encrypts the shares, ( E l ( s l ) , . . . , El(sr) ), and sends them lo a verifier (not only the shareholders).
The dealer demonstrates to the verifier the validity of thc cncrypted shares without revealing (SI, . . . , s,) , and if possible, wikhout, revealing any additional information. From this model, clearly, the security for the dealer can not be higher than that of the encryption schemes, E. Therefore security should be treated prudently in PVSS schemes. In [Sta96], Stadler presented two PVSS protocols: one is based on a discrete logarithm and the other is based on the RSA root problem. The first one is provably secure assuming the intractability of the Decision-Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem while the other was not formally discussed about security. Clearly, the security for the dealer depends on the difficulty of inverting of encryption function family E . In PVSS schemes, the most secure case exists when we can prove that the conspiracy of any less than k shareholders can not compute secret s as long as they can not invert any E j ( s j ) where Pj doesn't join the conspiracy. So as to formalize this situation, we define the hard instance generators and the adversary model and then introduce the secrecy condition. 
Our Results
Definitionl. Let
we
denote this adversary model by ADV"O(s).
A PVSS scheme has the secrecy condition if the probability that ADVUz0(E) 
. , s , ) + P u b V e r i f y ( E l ( s~) , . . . , E~( s I ) )
where E is negligible in IMESI, and Di is the decryption function corresponding to Ei (The probability is taken over the coin tosses of U and V ) ,
where c is negligible in (MESI and the distributions of S, pk, ssp, and S are equivalent that of hard instance generator G E . The probability is taken over the coin tosses of G E , U , and A D V .
Applications of PVSS
The VSS schemes proposed by Feldman and Pedersen in [Fe187, PedSl] are extremely efficient. Their schemes are even non-interactive. They are utilized in various cryptographic protocols because of their efficiency and non-interactiveness. However, considering some applications, they also have some demerits.
Assume that U is a dealer and P I , . . . , PI are I shareholders in a network. Here suppose that they do not have any broadcast channel nor any bulletin board.
In this situation, it seems to be difficult to construct a practical (k, /)-threshold VSS scheme by only using the techniques of [Fe187, Ped911. Public verifiability can resolve the problem. We consider other applications. Assume a public-key cryptosystem with the key escrow property. Let U be a user of the network, V be the network manager or the Government and the other shareholders, 9,. . . , P I , be escrow agencies. In the key escrow cryptosystems using the ordinary VSS schemes, V has to interact with escrow agencies every time each user U first joins in the network. Publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) schemes can resolve this problem. V never have to wait for any acknowledgments from escrow agencies, while V itself can verify the validity of the shares.
Moreover, the PVSS schemes can construct key escrow cryptosystems with hierarchy. This means that there exist classes of escrow agents and the secret key of a lower escrow agent is escrowed by upper class escrow agents.
Building Blocks
In this section, we prepare some building blocks for our protocol. By the space limitation, some protocols are described in Appendix. First of all, we set up two commitment schemes. 
-
The first commitment scheme, BC, has appeared in some previous papers and it is well known that opening the commitment with different representations is equivalent t o breaking RSA. The latter commitment scheme, m, was presented in [F097]. In [F097], it was proved that opening the commitment with different representations is as hard as breaking the factoring.
In Crypto'97, [F097] presented practical statistical zereknowledge protocols to prove modular polynomial relations in the secrets by using commitment E.
The following protocols are an improvement. By using commitment BC, the protocols can demonstrate the statement above more efficiently and in a perfect zero-knowledge manner (if including the set-up protocol) [Fuj98] . Those protocols are as secure against cheating provers as the RSA assumption. See Appendix for the actual protocols.
Checking Protocol: a (perfect) witness hiding protocol hctween a prover and a vcrifier in which the prover, on input ((N, b,v),c), convinces the verifier that he knows ( x l r ) such that c = BC(b,u,(zlr). We denote the checking protocol by CHCli(b,u)(c).
Mod-Multi Protocol: a (perfect) witness hiding protocol between a prover and a verifier in which the prover, on input ((N, 6 , v ) q , c2, c g ) , convinces the verifier that he knows (~1 ,~2 ,~3 , r~, r 2 ,~3 ) such that 2 We tlciiolcs tlic squaring protocol by S Q u ( b , u ) ( C l ; c2). 
PROOF[c = BC(s)
A
Checking Protocol I1
The following protocol is a modification of "Basic Protocol" in [F097]. It is a statistical witness hiding protocol in which the prover, on input ((N, b,gl,g2), c, m), convinces the verifier that he knows ( 2 ,~) such that c = B C ( b , g l ) ( 2 , ? -) and 2 E (~1-2~21, a+2"ti), r E ( -2 2 m~, 22mu). We denotes that by CHCK2(b, g, , ( a , u , m ) ) (~) . Prover's Claim: ( 2 ,~) such that c = BC(b,S1)(z,r) where x E ( -2"v + a, 2"v + a ) and r E ( -22mv, 22mv ).
Protocol: CHCK2(b,g, ,(a,u,"))(c) 
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 4, there exists a probabilistic poly-time knowledge extractor M such that for any probabilistic poly-time algorithm P* if probabilistic interactive algorithm (P*, V ) accepts with non-negligible probability in lNl, then M with P* as an oracle can extract ( 2 ,~) with non-negligible probability in IN1
such that c = BC(x, r ) where x E ( -2 ' " v +~, 2~v + a ) and r E ( -22"'v,22"'v ).
Sketch of Proof: M can extract the pairs, ( t i , j , e , X , R, w ? ,~) and ( t i j , e', X ' , R', w:,~) where
under the modified RSA assumption, we can prove that
where Ax -a = 5 and
Lemma 6. CHCIi?+b,gl ,(a,u,m))(c) is statistical witness indistinguishable if x E
( -v + a, v + a ), and r E ( -2mv,2mv ).
Transit Protocol
The transit protocol is a statistical witness hiding protocol in which the prover, on input ( ( N , b, g1,92,01 , vz)cl, c2), convinces the verifier that lie knows (xl, x2, rl, r z ) such that x1 mod v1 = 2 2 mod 212, c1 = BC (b,ul) 
(xl, P I ) , and c2 = BC(b,ua)(x2, r2).
We denotes the transit protocol by TRAN (b,ul ,up)(cl, c2) . The complexity of Prover's Claim: ( x l , 1 2 , r1, r2) such that c1 = BC (b,ul)(xl, r1) and c2 = BC (b,u,) (car r2) where xl x2
Protocol: TRAN(b,,,,,,)(c~, c2)
2"'+1v1 < 0 2 .
(mod v1). ( Z 2 , a ) and sends it to V 2. P executes with V ,
P sets i?= E ( b , g l )
-- (IKlod 211 ).
C C
C 1 CZ
C H C K [ b , u l ) ( c l ) , C H C K ( b , u p ) ( c 2 ) , c H c K ( g l , u l ) ( -) ,
CHC1c(gl
Sketch of Proof:
Assurric that C = B C ( ( b , g l ) (~, (~) .
By C H C K~g l , u l ) ( $ ) and C H C I <~g l , u 2 ) (~) ,
we can show that t = x l + k l v l = xz+kzvz. As CE~CK2~~,gl,(2mV1,ul,m))(C) gives that 0 < I < 2mt1w1 (< va), we can show x = x2 arid z1 = x2 mod v1. Here we give an assumption. If the modified RSA assumption and the following assumption hold true, our proposed PVSS scheme can be proved to be secure ( k , 1)-publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes (Our proposed PVKE and PVPKE systems based on the factoring can also be proved to be secure under these assumptions while those based on the discrete logarithm are not).
Assumption 8. Let E := ( E l , . . . , El) where Ei E & and
There exist two probabilistic polynomial-time I-tuple instance generators, G, and G g ) , having the following properties: Here we present a secure ( k , 1)-threshold publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme (PVSS scheme). Let D be a dealer, PI,. . . From Lemma 7, the proof is obvious.
Theoremlo. Under Assumptions, 4 and 8, the proposed protocol as secure ( k , 1)-publicly verifiable secret sharing.
From Lemma 9 and analogies of the traditional VSS schemes, the correctness and public verifiability are obvious, because any k shareholders, Pi,, . . . , P j k , can recover a unique and valid secret s by
We consider the secrecy condition. Our protocol is statistical zero-knowledge if the set-up protocol is executed. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can consider ADVU10 as ADVO that works as follows: 1. Input, to A D V , C := (Cl!. . . ,Cl)E CYPH' generated by GE. with non-negligible probability where
otherwise A13V quits.
Let C' , " and be the sarric defined in Assumption 8. We havc G , and the property of GE), we can compute C;' mod nj, by
where 5 E ( 0 , l ) and at = Cfi=l(&fi &-)sJ, mod v. This strategy succeeds 0 with non-negligible probability in lvl.
6
6.1
In this section, we describe a (k, 1)-threshold publicly verifiable key escrow (PVKE) scheme based on the factoring.
Let U be a user, PI , . . . , Pl be trustees and V be a verifier. Let ( N , b, g1 , g2, m ) be the public parameters, ( n i , e , ) denotes a public key of Pi and ( n , e ) denotes a public key of U , where (+) = 1, 1/2lnil < 1
, and m =
The user U generates (u, s) such that u2 = s4 mod n and (X) = -1. U choose
Publicly Verifiable Key Escrow (PVKE) Cryptosystems
PVKE cryptosystem based on the factoring
where aj E R Znl and at-1 # 0. Then U sets,for i = 1,. . . ,I, si := ( f ( i ) mod n)+ (am -&)n where 6, E ( 0 , l ) . Here note that ( 2 m -1)" < si < (2m + 1)n. U broadcasts (u, C1, . . . , Cl) where Ci := sf' mod n,.
U executes with V the following protocol: , b , g~, g z , m ) , { ( n ; , e i ) } , ( n , e , u ) , (Ci,...,Cr).
[User's Claim] he knows (C;le1,. . . , C:'") such that k-1 (C:'e' mod ni) s + a j i j (mod n) and u2 3 s4 (mod n). Due to the space limitation, we describe it in Appendix.
PVKE cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm 7 Publicly Verifiable Partial Key Escrow Cryptosystems
This section presents (publicly) verifiable partial key escrow cryptosystems. Verifiable partial key escrow (VPKE) is well described in [BG97]. In VPKE cryptosystems, the escrow agencies (shareholders) are only allowed to share partial informalion of users' private keys, so as not to recover a large number of users' private keys at the same time by malicious authorities. On the key recovery phase, the escrow agencies require a non-trivial amount of work to find private keys from the corresponding partial informations. In the VPKE cryptosystems, the most serious problem is the early recovery attack, pointed out in [BG97]. The early recovery attack is that the escrow agencies compute the unescrowed information of the private key before the collaboration and recover the whole private key quickly after the collaboration. To overcome this attack, [BG97] presented a VPKE cryptosystem with the delayed recovery property. The delayed recovery is opposite to the early recovery: In VPKE systems with the delayed recovery property, the agencies can not compute unescrowed informations before the collaboration and require non-trivial amount to recover the private keys after the collaboration (See [BG97] for details). Their scheme was based on the discrete logarithm and, to the best of our knowledge, no one seems to have presented any VPKE cryptosystem with the delayed recovery based on the factoring after their work [Mao97]. In the following, we describe (Publicly) VPKE cryptosystems, one based on the factoring and the other based on the discrete logarithm. As mentioned above, the factoring-based one seems to be the first VPKE cryptosystem based on the factoring with the delayed recovery.
Let U , Pl, . . . ,Pi, and V be the same as described above. Let ( N , b, 91, g 2 , m, { ( n i , e i ) } ) be the same as above, too. M E S := Z,,. If k is enough large (e.g. 6 = 481, these protocols are partial key escrow cryptosystems G t h t h i delayed recovery property. Before thecollaboration, it is impossible to determine di, and after the collaboration, trustees require almost
Conclusions
We have presented a provably secure PVSS scheme which is O(lv1) times more efficient t h a n Stadler's PVSS schemes, where 1 . 1 denotes t h e size of t h e secret.
It can be incorporated into key escrow cryptosystems based on the factoring and the discrete logarithm, and can transform t h e m to publicly verifiable key escrow (PVKE) ones or publicly verifiable partial key escrow ones. T h e PVKE and PVPKE systems based on the factoring can also be proved to be secure while those based on the discrete logarithm were not.
[Adding I"h~t:ol]: ADD(b,,,)(Ci, c2 : C g )
A perfect witness hiding prdocol bet,we:cn a prover and a verifier in which the prover, on input ( ( N , 6, v), c1, c2, c g ) , convinces the verifier 1,hat he knows ( Z~,~~, Z~, T~,~~, T~) such that 
Sketch of Proof:
Assume t h a t E = BC(b,g,)(Z, @). By CHCK~,,,,,)( $) and CHC~<(yl,u2)($), z = 21 + klvl = x z + kzvz. As CHCi;2(b,y~,(o,u~,~))(~) gives that (-02 <) --2"v1 < 2 < 2 m~1 (< va), we can show that 2 = 22 or xz -v2. Therefore,
21
(ZZ -6 0 2 ) (mod 01) where 6 E ( 0 , l ) . 
